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ARTICLES

WATER ALLOCATION BY COMPREHENSIVE PERMIT
SYSTEMS IN THE EAST: CONSIDERING A MOVE AWAY
FROM ORTHODOXY
Robert H. Abrams*
INTRODUCTION

In the last half of the Twentieth Century a number of states
located in the humid Eastern United States have replaced their
traditional common law riparian systems governing water allocation with permit systems. The standard explanation accompanying
the repudiation of the common law has been that the riparian doctrine provides too little certainty regarding the nature and magnitude of water rights to afford a reliable basis on which to manage
water in times of scarcity.' A corollary premise has been that effective management of water resources requires that the system
adopted in riparianism's stead be a comprehensive one that controls the entire range of water uses within the jurisdiction.
The working hypothesis for the speech from which this article
grows' was consistent with those premises: a review of Eastern per* Professor of Law, Wayne State University, School of Law; Vice-Chairman, American
Bar Association Section of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law, Water Resources Committee. This article together with two others form a loosely related trilogy about
the future of riparianism in the Eastern United States. The first of the articles attempts to
describe and verify a theory of when water law changes and shows that riparianism in the
East is at such a juncture, see Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism;An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 Wayne L. Rev. 1381 (1989); this article questions the value of
existing permit systems as alternatives to riparianism; the final article focuses more attention on the detailed characteristics of how permit systems and other regulatory mechanisms
might operate in the future, see Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 93 (1989). The author would like to acknowledge the generous research support for these articles provided by the Richard J. and Elizabeth Schomer Barber
Foundation and the Wayne State Law School Faculty Research Fund. The views expressed
herein are those of the author.
See infra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
This article is adapted from a presentation delivered to the "Workshop on Eastern
Water Law" held in Annapolis, Maryland on May 18, 1989 under the joint sponsorship of
the American Bar Association Section of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental
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mit systems and their experience in coping with water scarcity
would demonstrate the general superiority of comprehensive permit systems over both common law riparianism and more fragmented legislative and administrative regulatory efforts. The subsequent inquiry, however, cast doubt on the inherent superiority of
comprehensive permit systems as compared with much more
targeted regulatory intervention. This article will explore the comparative merits of comprehensive and targeted regulatory systems
with an eye toward identifying the conditions under which each is
to be preferred.8
The first part of the article briefly reviews the common law of
riparianism and canvasses its major weaknesses in allocating water
in times of even modest shortage. The second part discusses the
apparent virtues of a comprehensive permit system as an alternative. The two leading comprehensive permit systems, those of Florida (closely following the Model Water Code) and Iowa, are reviewed as to specific content and perceptions of their performance.
This portion of the article provides a generally favorable picture of
those systems tempered by measured criticisms of their performance under fire and by political considerations that have limited
the ability of comprehensive regulatory systems to win more widespread adoption.
The third part of the article opens with a review of two contemporary water allocation cases that arose in the Eastern United
States. One is a groundwater well interference case and the other is
an interstate, interbasin water transfer case. Both are offered as a
test for the efficacy of comprehensive permit systems; in both settings the permit systems are found wanting. In the former, a comprehensive permit system is far more cumbersome an apparatus
than is necessary to govern the well interference setting efficiently.
In the latter, most comprehensive permit systems offer little or no
guidance to the permitting agency on the advisability of interbasin
transfers. These shortcomings in the paradigmatic comprehensive
permit system invite a more probing attitude toward comprehensive permit systems as they presently are structured.
The remainder of the article attempts to develop a systematic

Law and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources.
I The specific characteristics of the available water sources as either surface water or
groundwater is relevant, but only insofar as the type of water source may have a bearing on
the best means for its management. Thus, this article will give examples from both arenas,
although the preponderance of the material will focus on the management of surface water.
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means for assessing how Eastern states might best supplement or
replace their common law of riparianism. Here the initial focus is
on the interests of people affected by the performance of the permit system. By categorizing those interests as a permittee's interest in certainty, the agency's interest in a balance between policy
guidance and decisional flexibility, and the public's interest in coherent resource management, the article identifies a rough set of
objectives that regulatory systems ought to advance. To make that
discussion more concrete, the article surveys a small sample of
ways in which those objectives can be furthered, none of which is
the exclusive province of comprehensive permit systems and some
of which are at variance with the standard comprehensive permit
systems that have thus far emerged as the models. In this way, the
article advocates a move away from orthodoxy.
I.

COMMON LAW RIPARIANISM AND ITS WEAKNESSES

The common law of riparianism identifies the rights-holders
quite readily because it treats water as a usufruct of owning property that adjoins a watercourse. In this facet of its operation,
riparianism is at its clearest-the class of rights-holders can be objectively identified with relative ease. In a parallel fashion, the Restatement (Second) of Torts reasonable use groundwater rule
plainly grants a usufructuary right to owners of parcels overlying
the aquifer from which the water is being withdrawn.'
In contrast to the ease of identifying rights-holders, for quantification of the extent of that right, riparianism and its groundwater
law sibling 5 both rely on a reasonable use rule that approaches the
ultimate in amorphousness. To measure the extent of the permissible use by one member of the user class in competition with other
such members, these two regimes both employ a "reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances" type of approach. Section 850A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a laundry list of

' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858 (1970).
" There are several groundwater regimes operative in the United States today. See generally J. Sax & R. Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources 786-96 (1986). Most of the
states in the East follow either a common law reasonable use rule, see, e.g., Metropolitan
Utilities Dist. of Omaha v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 800-02, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637
(1966), or the reasonable use rule announced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858
(1970). The common law form focuses exclusively on whether the use of water on the overlying tract is, in isolation, reasonable. The Restatement (Second) employs a multifactor context-sensitive approach much more similar to surface water reasonable use riparianism. The
text here refers only to the latter type of reasonable use rule.
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factors that a court must weigh in either the surface water or
groundwater paradigm. Paraphrasing the factors, they are:
(a) purpose of use,
(b) suitability to the watercourse,
(c) economic values at stake,
(d) social values at stake,
(e) harm caused,
(f) accommodation possibilities (adjusting methods of use to
avoid the harm),
(g) more accommodation possibilities (adjusting amount used),
(h) protecting existing economies,
(j) justice and loss-bearing ability.'
This determination of whether a particular water use is legally protected might be labelled a "gestalt" method of water allocation. It
suffers a debilitating unpredictability of outcome which is only
partially redeemed by the flexibility to attempt to discern and effect a maximizing compromise outcome.
Pyle v. Gilbert7 displays the pivotal weakness of riparianism.
There, the Gilberts, as plaintiffs, operated a 140-year-old waterpowered gristmill and boat livery as a tourist attraction in rural
Georgia. Defendants were several farmers who had begun diverting
substantial quantities of water from the same watercourse for irrigation to avoid crop losses with the result that the Gilberts were
left trying to market an inoperative gristmill and mudhole to their
patrons. In this way Pyle is a true water shortage case in which the
competing riparians needed the same water at the same time: one
user needed it in-stream, while the other needed it off-stream.
The trial court granted the Gilberts' summary judgment motion
on the ground that use of water for irrigation was per se unreasonable under Georgia's traditional common law. Quite appropriately
under modern riparianism, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed
that holding, finding both uses, recreation/tourism and irrigation,
to be generally reasonable' and remanded the case to the trial
court to apply the reasonable use test. Unfortunately, riparianism's
nine-factor gestalt method does not point to a clear winner in this
user conflict: neither use is, in legal terms, a priori preferable to
the other.
The results of this case, and virtually all other cases of true
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850(A) (1970).
' 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980).
' Id. at 409, 265 S.E.2d at 588.
6
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shortage in which an accommodation of the competing users is not
evident, illustrate that the riparian doctrine offers no consistent
basis on which to decide disputes between competing users; no hierarchy of uses is suggested by the Georgia Supreme Court. While
that court directed the trial court to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 850A factors, it cautioned: "we cannot and do not
here approve all that is said therein, we refer to it for whatever
help it may be."9 Pity the poor trial judge on remand; pity more
riparian jurisdictions in general.
Numerous areas governed by a riparian system face increasing
water demands and pressure to engage in more extensive water
regulation.' 0 In some locations these pressures are populationdriven. For example, in Southeastern coastal areas, an influx of
new residents is generating additional water demands in an area
where water supplies are limited by the tidal influence on rivers
and by salt water intrusion into aquifers. In other regions, the impetus to greater regulation is drought-driven. Several times in the
past decade, and especially in 1988, major droughts have played
havoc with the historic balance of water supply and demand.
Spurred on by minimal rainfall, many farmers turned to irrigation,
escalating demand for a high-volume use of water at precisely the
same time when surface water supplies were at low ebb. Emergency measures were adopted in numerous areas of the East."
Moreover, the best predictions associated with the greenhouse effect on climatic change in this region anticipate decreased summer
soil moisture, a sure proxy for increased irrigation. 2 Other predictions indicate substantial decreases in surface water availability. 3

Id. at 411 n.10, 265 S.E.2d at 589.
,o For a more extended discussion of the potential for water shortage in the Eastern
United States, see Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism; An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 Wayne L. Rev. 1381 (1989).
" See Drought Triggers Restrictions, Conservation Measures, AWWA Mainstream, September 1988, at 8 (a newsletter of the American- Water Works Association). In particular,
various states and cities imposed water conservation and rationing programs, some
mandatory and others voluntary, to reduce water use. The year 1989 began with more of the
same; through April many reservoir levels in the Northeast were 60% below normal and
several major metropolitan areas were already restricting water use.
" Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 109-11 (1988) (statement of Dr. Syukuro Manabe, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States Department of Commerce).
" See Cohen, Impacts of CO,-Induced Climatic Change on Water Resources in the
Great Lakes Basin, 8 Climatic Change 135 (1986)(study of Great Lakes region).
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These developments are the heralds of common law riparianism's
undoing and of an increased reliance on alternatives, particularly
water use permit systems.
II.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPREHENSIVE EASTERN STATES

WATER USE PERMIT SYSTEMS

A permit system for the allocation of water does not rely exclusively on the common law and judicial application of legal rules.
Permit systems add the element of an administrative agency possessed of some degree of authority to oversee and direct the allocation of a state's water resources. This definition is sufficiently
broad to claim that most states, both East and West, have permit
systems rather than common law systems.1"
Temporarily putting to one side the differences between comprehensive and more limited systems, most Eastern permit systems
have their roots in the riparian doctrine being replaced. Professor
Dellapenna coined the term "regulated riparianism" to describe
this phenomenon and gave the following summary:
every direct user of water (excepting only variously defined small
users in most states) must have a permit from a state administrative agency to use water. Further the rights of users are determined
by the permits, and not by the riparian nature of the use. What
this system has in common with pure riparian rights is that the
criterion by which permit applications are judged is whether the
proposed use is a "reasonable use" of the water (or in some jurisdictions, a "reasonable-beneficial use").15

This description may understate the differences between permit
statutes and traditional riparianism. Despite the linguistic similarity of the governing standards for permit issuance and the common
law of riparianism, the permit applications are reviewed before the
14

See generally Sherk, Eastern Water Law, 1 (4) Nat. Resources & Envt. 7 (1986) (for

the East); A. Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources (1988) (for the West). To state
that permit systems are already a common feature of the water law landscape is not to say
that riparianism is moribund; a few states have retained pure common law systems. The
common law rules of riparianism continue to have force in a variety of contexts even in
jurisdictions that have adopted comprehensive permit systems. For example, basic questions
about water recreation or wharfing out still are answered exclusively by reference to riparian

doctrine.
" Dellapenna, Owning Surface Water in the Eastern United States, Proceedings of the
Sixth Annual Eastern Mineral Law Institute at 1-34 to 1-35 (1985). See also Fleming, Water

Allocation: The Reasonable and Beneficial Use Standards, 53 Fla. Bar J. 25 (1979); Maloney, Capehart & Hoofman, Florida's "Reasonable Beneficial" Water Use Standard: Have
East and West Met?, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 253 (1979).
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use is initiated, 16 and the permitting agency is empowered (and in
some instances required) to consider the impact of the permit on
competing uses, including public and other in-stream uses, of the
water. 17 This authority enables the permitting agency to advance
policy goals. For example, because permits quantify uses, permit
systems offer a ready opportunity to institute a withdrawal and/or
consumption fee on a per unit basis as an inducement to water
conservation.18
The Attraction of Managerialism

A.

It is important to understand the motivations for the move away
from riparianism toward administrative control of water allocation.
There are a variety of factors that inspire such a shift, but none is
more elemental than water shortage. Reviewing water law history
of the Western mountain states to put this change in perspective,
the immediate rejection of riparianism in favor of prior appropriation was heralded by judicial opinions that included invocations
such as, "[i]n a dry and thirsty land . . . .,I The rejection of
riparianism was a function of the need to allocate water on a predictable basis where there was an insufficient water supply. In the
arid West, to fail to repudiate the indeterminacy of outcomes
under common law riparianism was to condemn the region to remain largely barren, unable to utilize fully those limited water resources that were present.
It is not taxing to make the case in the abstract that a managerial system, such as a comprehensive permit system, is far preferable to continued adherence to riparianism or common law groundwater allocation rules. Three lines of argument predominate. First,
private property rules are ineffective at producing the maximum
set of benefits from a common pool resource. Second, managerial
16

Dellapenna, supra note 15, at 1-35. See also Keeton, Iowa's New Water Statute-The

Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 549, 615 (1962).
1 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.223 (West 1987). Permits could, in theory, be limited in
duration to allow reallocation of the water in the future, or unlimited in duration if a greater
degree of certainty to the permit holder is a desiratun. See, e.g., Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191, 256-264 (1977).
'8 This remains a hypothetical possibility, as research has found no Eastern state which
in fact makes a substantial charge. Most water pricing in the East is related to the cost of
diversion and transmission to users, treating the resource itself as a free good. With limited
exceptions, the appropriation of water in the West also treats the water as a free good until
rights to its use are perfected by a water user. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying
text.
' Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872).
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allocations offer the possibility of precise quantification of right
and thereby the potential for increased security of right. Third,
managerial systems are proactive rather than reactive.
Water, with its natural occurrence being in lake and stream systems that usually traverse property boundaries, is a quintessential
common pool resource. Under riparianism, while one user's rights
are bounded by a respect for the correlative rights of others, there
remains an incentive for every user to increase use of the commons
and thereby obtain as large a share of the resource as possible. The
selfish incentive to overuse the commons is reinforced in riparian
doctrine by the preference favoring existing uses expressed in factor h of Section 850A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 0 Although not dispositive of all cases, that factor tacitly encourages a
race to put as large a quantity of water to use as possible in hopes
uses that
of winning judicial protection against subsequent 2water
1
would usurp the water supply of the first entrant.
In contrast to reliance on the common law, having an administrative body charged with allocational decision-making avoids such
over-use. An example from the groundwater area in a jurisdiction
that employs the traditional common law of reasonable use doctrine makes this point. Under the common law reasonable use doctrine, an owner of land overlying an aquifer can pump with legal
impunity as much water as desired provided that the water is devoted to a "reasonable use" on the overlying tract.22 The legal right
is to withdraw water from the aquifer without regard for the consequences on others who would seek to use it. Consequently, a lowvalue user, perhaps a gravel pit operator dewatering a pit, may deprive a high-value user, such as a steel mill or other industrial facility, of its water. A managerial system for water allocation can
avoid interference with high-value uses by limiting, denying, or
conditioning permits issued for low-value uses.
The second advantage of regulatory intervention is the ability to
overcome riparianism's lack of specificity regarding the extent of a
water right. Riparian rights are not, by their nature, quantified
rights which secure to their possessor a right to take water under
2 See supra note 6. (Factor h instructs courts to protect existing economies.)
" In the groundwater context discussed below, reasonable use encourages a "race to the
pumphouse" that produces the same type of tragedy of the commons that led to the disastrous over-production in the early history of the oil industry. The response there, like that
advanced here, was repudiation of common law property rules in favor of administrative
management.
" See Sax & Abrams, supra note 5, at 786-96.
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all conditions. Riparian rights are adjudicated infrequently and decrees in such cases are binding upon only the parties thereto and
only so long as the underlying factual conditions remain unchanged. To illustrate, hypothesize that upon remand the trial
judge in Pyle v. Gilbert2s holds in favor of the millpond use. That
decision would be implemented by a decree forbidding Pyle and
the other irrigating defendants from decreasing the flow into the
pond below the rate sufficient to protect the Gilberts' use. Presumably, other upstream irrigators, although not bound by res judicata, would find their irrigation efforts blocked by stare decisis. In
contrast, no similarly predictable fate necessarily follows for new
upstream entrants making non-irrigation water uses such as for
manufacturing or residential development. Should such additional
competing uses be initiated, the rights of the Gilberts would have
to be relitigated, leaving the millpond operation again at risk despite its initial legal victory.
The characteristic uncertainty of riparian rights does not promote the establishment of security of right. Stated rhetorically,
would a prudent bank or thrift institution lend large sums of
money in reliance on the Gilberts' riparian right to receive sufficient flow to operate their enterprise? In contrast to riparianism, a
permit system can provide certainty of right as permits are usually
quantified and normally will not be issued in the absence of available water sufficient to satisfy the entitlements of all permit
holders.2 4
The final attraction of a regulatory system is its ability to act
before serious allocational problems mature into water crises.
Riparianism in particular, and the common law in general, resolve
legal disputes only after they have ripened sufficiently to allow either a concrete claim, or threatened infringement, of right. The entire thrust of a permit system is a managerial approach which attempts to match allocation of available water supply with the
state's discernible water needs. For example, rather than reacting
to a groundwater overdraft situation, a state with a permit system
can limit the total withdrawals from an aquifer to an amount equal
to the average annual recharge of the aquifer, thereby avoiding the
possibility of serious overdraft of the aquifer and reducing the possibility of widespread well interference claims.25 Additional permit
"' 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980). See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying discussion.
"' See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
2" Overdraft is an aquifer-wide condition in which the rate of groundwater withdrawals
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conditions regarding well-spacing can prospectively reduce even
further the possibility of well interference.2 6 Returning to the Pyle
v. Gilbert setting as another example, a permit system can proactively mediate in-stream/off-stream user conflicts by prescribing as
a permit condition for off-stream users a minimum streamflow that
must be maintained.
The claimed advantages of the administrative allocation of water
are not free goods. Offsetting the anticipated gains are predictable
pitfalls of managerialism that can be lumped into two camps: monetary costs needed to support the operation of the system and inefficiencies resulting from bad administrative judgment. Importantly, the monetary costs extend beyond the salaries of the
bureaucratic personnel necessary to staff the permit agency and
the space required to house them. Rather, costs accrue to the permit applicants and other interested parties for the time and hired
expertise that must attend their participation in the permit system. Additional monetary costs surely arise as a result of the delays inherent in the operation of any quasi-adjudicative body in
which multiple perspectives are represented and administrative decisions are subject to several layers of agency and judicial review.
The costs associated with bad administrative judgments are
more difficult to identify and assess. 27 In a farm belt state, for example, the administrative agency might be too generous with farmrelated water use permits and too niggardly with industrial permits
despite the fact that in almost all instances industrial uses will be
of far higher value. 8 From an economist's perspective, this alloca-

exceeds the rate of aquifer recharge. The result is that the water table falls and pump lifts
(and therefore pumping costs) for all water users are increased. Continued overdraft will
eventually cause wells to fail as the water table drops below the bottom hole of the various
pumping wells. Well interference is a more localized phenomenon in which the pumping
action of one well causes a lowering of the water table in the vicinity of the well. Such a
"cone of depression" can adversely affect the productive capacity of nearby wells.
"OSee infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
"7An intermediate form of inefficiency between administrative overhead and administrative malallocation of the water resource is administrative overmanagement. In a basin with
no foreseeable potential for shortage, to have any managerial system whatsoever is to
overmanage and to incur costs that produce no benefit. Sophisticated rules of permit system
inclusion and exclusion can be drawn to limit the cost of overmanagement. See infra notes
96-99 and accompanying text.
" The bad judgments may include those by the legislature in fixing policy guidelines for
the administrative agency. The preference for a less valuable use over a more valuable one
could issue from the legislature and be beyond the authority of the agency to change. See,
e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.266(2) (West Supp. 1989) (preferring livestock production use
to manufacturing and industrial or power generation use); but see infra note 45.
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tion of a scarce resource is inefficient and more likely to occur in a
system that relies on a governmental, rather than a market, allocation of the resource.
In the abstract, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding
the net benefits of permit systems over common law allocation of
the water resource. Provided that water use conflicts actually exist
within an Eastern state, the flaws of the common law and the
strengths of permit systems in that setting appear sufficient to indicate a preference for the managerial approach despite its costs.
To move beyond that gross judgment requires a more intimate understanding of how comprehensive administrative systems operate.
B. Reviewing Major Permit System Initiatives
Turning to the specifics of Eastern permit systems, two Eastern
states are acknowledged leaders in the field of comprehensive
water permit systems. Both Iowa, in 1957, and Florida, in 1972,
attempted a deliberate and wide-ranging repudiation of common
law riparianism in favor of comprehensive permit systems. Although among the earliest Eastern permit systems, they remain
prototypical as both states proceeded along readily predictable
general lines: the central elements of the systems include a permit
requirement for all non-domestic uses of water exceeding a prescribed volume; the permits, when issued, are specific to both location and use and are of limited duration; finally, the systems are
administered by a regulatory agency pursuant to legislative policy
guidance.
To give a fuller understanding of how such a permit system
works, it is helpful to review the Iowa law in substantially greater
detail."9 Originally, Iowa employed a list of exempt, "non-regulated" uses to define the scope of the water permit requirement.
Some exemptions from regulation were based on type of use, (e.g.,
domestic), some on water source (e.g., interstate rivers), and still
others on volume. In 1985, the matter of exemption was made
largely quantitative, with 25,000 gallons per day (gpd), a mere onethirteenth of an acre-foot, being the regulatory threshold."
" The Iowa law has undergone revision and recodification. Originally, it appeared in
Chapter 455A of the Iowa Code. In 1982, those provisions were repealed by Acts of 1982 (69
G.A.) ch. 1199, § 97, eff. July 1, 1983. The repealed sections were reenacted with some
changes in Chapter 455B of the Code of 1983. Those provisions have, periodically, been
amended further.
30 Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.261(8) (West Supp. 1989).
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As revised, the statute now requires a permit for all "regulated"
water uses that are characterized as "depleting" uses.31 In theory,
there may be a class of non-depleting uses which are free from regulation without regard to their quantitative extent. On the statute
books, however, depleting uses (and therefore regulated uses) are
defined with a broad brush, encompassing "the storage, diversion,
conveyance, or other use of a supply of water if the use may impair
rights of lower or surrounding users, may impair the natural resources of the state, or may injure the public welfare if not
controlled." 2
Once coverage is determined, the state agency is charged with
accepting and granting permit applications for the "diversion, storage or withdrawal [of water] . . . consistent with the principles and
policies of beneficial use and ensuring conservation."3 3 "Beneficial
use" is defined as "the application of water to a useful purpose
that inures to the benefit of the water user and subject to the
user's dominion and control but does not include the waste or pollution of water." ' Permit applications are not considered in a vacuum (in comparison with, for example, common law reasonable use
groundwater rules); rather, the agency is to consider the impact on
streamflow requirements" and adverse third-party effects. 6 No express authority to protect water table depths is found in the statute, but that power appears implicit in a prohibition against permit issuance that "will unreasonably impair the long-term
availability of water from a surface or groundwater source .
In fact, specific administrative regulations covering some groundwater management issues were enacted early in the statute's
history."
Under Iowa's comprehensive system, permits are an appurtenance of the land and are thus transferable only when the land
itself is conveyed. 39 All permits are of ten years duration and are
renewable for a like period, although storage permits may be
31Id.

§§ 455B.261(9), .268.

3 Id. § 455B.261(6).
" Id. § 455B.265.

Id. § 455B.261(7).
The administrative agency is expressly empowered by Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.261(15)
(West Supp. 1989) to set minimum streamflow requirements.
36Id. §§ 455B.264, .267.
37 Id. § 455B.267(4).
" Note, A Proposal for a Regulated Market of Water Rights in Iowa, 65 Iowa L. Rev.
979, 998-1000 (1980) (authored by Tabor).
39Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.273 (West Supp. 1989).
34

"
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granted for a duration equal to the life of the storage structure.4 0
Permits may be granted subject to specific conditions affecting duration, frequency of withdrawal and amount to be withdrawn.4 1 All
permits may be modified or revoked prior to their expiration (1) if
violated, (2) if non-use occurs, (3) if necessary to protect "public
health or safety, to protect the public interests in lands or waters,
to require conservation measures or to prevent substantial injury
to persons or property in any manner," or (4) if necessary because
of a water shortage emergency."' Non-use is a special case in that
non-use for three years is grounds for revocation except when the
reason for non-use is a failure to irrigate because of adequate
rainfall.43
In the 1980s, Iowa extensively revised its permit system. A number of the legislative alterations have already been described above
and represent a fine-tuning of the existing orthodox permit system
rather than a significant departure. The legislature, however,
added a major section expanding the allocative directives to the
management agency and adopted priorities to determine which
types of uses would be curtailed in time of shortage. Upon the occurrence of specified triggering events such as actual or imminent
water shortage, or a gubernatorial declaration of a disaster emergency, the administrative agency is requiredto insist on emergency
conservation measures by all permittees and is also empowered to
suspend or restrict permitted uses in accordance with the list of
priorities." The list is worth noting as an example of extreme legislative precision in the policy making arena-again a break with orthodoxy in these matters. Uses will be curtailed in the following
order:
(a) water to be conveyed interstate;
(b) water for recreation and aesthetics;
(c) water for irrigation of specified crops, mostly grains;
(d) water for irrigation of other crops;
(e) water for manufacturing and industrial use;
(f) water for public power generation;
(g) water for livestock production;
(h) publicly supplied water for human use;
40

Id. § 455B.265(3).

41

Id. § 455B.265.

Id. § 455B.271(2)-(3).
" Id. § 455B.272.
44 Id. § 455B.266(1).
"
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(i) privately supplied water for human use."'
This additional section, with its series of allocative priorities, is a
major break with orthodoxy in Eastern permit systems and merits
special attention.
C.

Evaluating the Performance of Eastern Permit Systems

A number of commentators have reviewed the performance of
Eastern permit systems in allocating water. Looking first at the
commentary on the comprehensive permit systems comparable to
those in Florida and Iowa, the praise is almost universal, but the
tone is muted. Professor Ausness, one of the drafters of the Model
Water Code"' which provided the basis for Florida's program,
found that Florida had encountered significant problems in coordinating actions taken by local water management agencies with the
larger state planning effort.' 7 Moreover, he found the state planning effort itself lacking, citing its failure to coordinate water use
consumption permits with water quality concerns.'" A second,
more pragmatic critique of Florida's permit system, giving off echoes of the earlier criticism levelled at Pyle v. Gilbert,"9 pointed to
the necessity of "those institutions responsible for formulating
water policy in Florida to articulate a means for allocating water
50
among competing applicants.
Professor Hines' exhaustive early study of Iowa's permit system
found that the law had scarcely been tested in the relatively wet
decade that followed its enactment.5 1 Even so, he mused about the
failure of the legislation to prepare a series of priorities among uses
that would serve as a basis for the management of anticipated fu-

45 Id. § 455B.266(2). The first option may be unconstitutional as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982). The preference for livestock over industrial use was criticized previously. See supra
note 28. It is defensible on the ground that temporary deprivation of water to industry
results in loss of output where, in contrast, deprivation of water to livestock destroys the
capital asset on which much of the regional economy is built.
46 F. Maloney, R. Ausness & J. Morris, A Model Water Code With Commentary (1972).
7 Ausness, The Influence of the Model Water Code on Water Resources Management
Policy in Florida, 3 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 1, 20-22 (1987).
"8Id. at 27-28.
49 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
0 Earl & Ankersen, Slicing the Water Supply Pie: Competing Applications Under Florida's Water Resources Act, 61 Fla. Bar J. 87, 90 (No. 6, June, 1987).
"' See Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System-Part Two,
8 Nat. Resources J. 23, 71 (1968).
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ture shortages.52 In 1980, after several dry years had come and
gone, a later commentator soundly criticized the Iowa permit system for its failure to respond adequately to dry times. In spite of
the permit system, Iowa public water systems had been forced to
adopt rationing, irrigation had been halted to protect streamflow
and hundreds of farm wells had gone dry. 3
Despite the generally favorable reaction to comprehensive regulatory systems,54 not all states have followed in Florida's and
Iowa's wake. Professor Butler suggests that this resistance is the
product of "the high cost of implementing the comprehensive reforms ....
In Indiana, for example, a well-conceived comprehensive regulatory program was proposed in 1982, but it proved so
politically controversial that it won enactment only in a greatly
weakened form." Commentators see this failure of legislatures to
enact additional comprehensive statutes as particularly, unfortunate insofar as non-comprehensive permit systems have come in
for more vitriolic criticism. The most thorough study to date of
non-comprehensive systems offered a pessimistic assessment:
"55

Piecemeal . . .laws concerning dams, water use by non-riparians,
acquisition of water by political subdivisions of the state, environmental protection, and streamflow requirements ... [have] not resulted in the replacement of the riparian doctrine with comprehensive state water codes. If anything, more uncertainty has resulted
because of the inconsistencies inherent in any piecemeal approach

See Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System-Part One,
7 Nat. Res. J. 499, 547-48 (1967) (only domestic priority established). The Iowa legislature
later established water priorities. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
33 See generally Note, supra note 38. As discussed previously, the Iowa
legislature responded to this problem directly during the 1980s. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text.
" See also, e.g., Ausness, supra note 17; Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East:
A Programfor Reform, 24 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 547 (1983); Davis, Eastern Water Diversion
Permit Statutes: Precedentsfor Missouri?, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 429 (1982).
5 Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction:Defining the
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95, 100-01 (1985)
(footnote omitted). Elsewhere, Professor Butler stresses the need for comprehensive water
planning to reflect a tripartite water ethic that considers equity, environment and efficiency.
She suggests that the failure to account for these more diverse concerns is a central reason
for the failure of more jurisdictions to enact comprehensive reform. See Butler, Defining A
Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986
U. Ill. L. Rev. 439, 479-80.
" Compare Governor's Water Rights and Management Commission, Report to Governor
Robert D. Orr, Nov. 12, 1982 (hereinafter Indiana Draft Statute) with Ind. Code Ann. §§ 132-6.1-1 to -9 (Burns 1987) (enacted as P.L.164-1983, § 1).
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to policy development.
III.

THE CASE FOR EMBRACING VARIETY IN APPROACHES

The conventional wisdom sounds a chorus of recurrent, rather
well-worn arguments bemoaning the failings of riparianism and extolling the potential virtues of comprehensive permit systems. 8
Nevertheless, several Eastern states have spurned the advantages
of such permit systems and water allocation remains the province
of common law jurisprudence, be it riparianism or the several
groundwater regimes. Even in permit-based jurisdictions, allocative
standards make little effort to distance themselves from their riparian ancestors. These points raise the question of why riparianism
has been so hearty, especially when comprehensive water management offers so highly touted an alternative. As suggested above,
riparianism's persistence may stem from a lack of political courage
in the face of vocal opposition (or a lack of political will in the face
of inertia). There is, however, a second possibility: dissatisfaction
with comprehensive permit systems as an alternative. This possibly calls into question the view that the conventional comprehensive permit systems described thus far are generally what is called
for in Eastern states water law.
A.

Contemporary Action/Reaction Scenarios

To test the alternate thesis, one starting point is to determine
whether contemporary water allocation problems which are inadequately addressed by the traditional common law are in fact better
suited to resolution by the standard comprehensive permit systems. To answer this question, one approach is to survey the universe of recent Eastern water allocation cases in search of those
which would test the efficacy of various approaches to water allocation (i.e., common law, comprehensive permit systems and noncomprehensive regulatory approaches). 9
'

Sherk, supra note 14, at 7.

88

See, e.g., D. Haber, "Introductory Essay," in The Law of Water Allocation In the East-

ern United States, xxv, xxvii-xxxii (D. Haber & S. Bergen eds. 1958); Lauer, Reflections on
Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1970).
" Admittedly, the water allocation problems arising in reported opinions are not a perfect
reflection of the set of water allocation problems actually occurring during the period, but
they are one indicator. This sort of approach is acceptable methodologically when, as here,
the purpose of the inquiry is not to disprove the utility of comprehensive permit systems in
all instances, but merely to demonstrate the existence of situationally attractive
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This survey of a six-year period found that mixed with a good
number of drainage cases, local nuisance cases and a few boundary
disputes, there were two quite significant water allocation cases:
Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America6 ° and State of North
Carolina v. Hudson."' The former is a well interference problem
and the latter involves litigation over an interstate, interbasin diversion of surface water to the Tidewater area of Virginia.
Looking at these two specific scenarios, a strong case can be
made that neither the common law nor a standard permit system
performs well. The criticisms of common law conform to expectations. A comprehensive permit system involves vast over-regulation
in the well interference context while the same permit system provides far too little regulation to manage interbasin water transfers
effectively.
1. Groundwater for Irrigation Causing Well Interference
In Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America," a classic well
interference case, numerous local small-volume wells belonging to
independent farmers were affected by defendant's use of high-volume irrigation wells. The farmers brought suit against the defendant corporation seeking both injunctive relief to stop the defendant
from pumping the water for irrigation purposes as well as money
damages. 3 The common law reasonable use rule afforded no remedy to plaintiffs. The court relied, therefore, on a newly-enacted
statute to resolve the conflict.
The decision in Prohosky was based on a non-comprehensive
regulatory regime administered by the Indiana Department of
Natural Resources (DNR). The statute was denominated an
"Emergency Regulation" by the Indiana General Assembly. It governed high-capacity wells (over 100,000 gallons per day) only in the
two counties that were the locus of the litigation. The law effectively granted to the DNR administrative authority to order cessation of high-volume pumping whenever the administrative agency
found that those irrigation wells caused the failure of qualifying
domestic and livestock wells. 6 4 To qualify for well interference pro-

alternatives.
60 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
"' 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
" 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
"' Id. at 1338.
" See generally Law of Water Rights: Emergency Regulation, P.L. 102, 1982 Ind. Acts
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tection, domestic and livestock wells had to meet guidelines set by
the administrative agency. The "guidelines were designed by reference to what the DNR considered to be generally accepted standards of well construction in the industry.

. .

in order to promote

the shared use of the resource contemplated by the General
Assembly. '""

The Prohosky court found as a factual matter that the evidence
introduced in the case indicated that there had been no user conflict between "qualifying" low-volume wells and the high-volume
user. Those who had improved their wells in order to qualify for
well interference protection were no longer failing to receive water
through them; an adjustment in their method of diversion had
eliminated the user conflict. In effect, as interpreted by the court,
the Indiana statute reflects a legislative preference for low-volume
users. However, that preference is subject to an administrative
overlay that protects the public interest in full utilization of the
resource by allowing the state agency to insist that low-volume
users improve the efficiency of their wells before they can obtain
the benefit of the legislative preference.
Would Indiana have been better off with either the common law
or the Restatement (Second) of Torts reasonable use of groundwater rule? Would Indiana have been better off with a full-blown
comprehensive permit system instead of its more focused one? Although the outcomes under each of these alternative regimes
would have resembled the actual outcome, the focused regulatory
intervention method is optimal.
Under Indiana's common law reasonable use groundwater rule,
the high-volume user is not subject to liability. 6 Therefore, lowvolume users who invest in improved wells obtain no post-investment protection against increased pumping by high-volume users.
This lack of certainty deters low-volume users from investing in
well improvements. Further, low-volume users are typically not in
the position to bear the cost of gathering the type of aquifer data
needed to make an informed decision about the wisdom of improv861 (current version at Ind. Code §§ 13-2-2.5-2 to -12)(Burns 1987 & Supp. 1989).
" 584 F. Supp. at 1345. In a statutory epilogue to the case, the Indiana General Assembly
reenacted the "Emergency Regulations" provision on a state-wide basis. Now, potential
complainants are qualifying low-volume wells generally ("nonsignificant groundwater withdrawal facilities") and those that may be curtailed are the high-volume wells ("significant
groundwater withdrawal facilities"). Ind. Code Ann. § 13-2-2.5-2 (Burns Supp. 1989).
6 For a discussion of this point and others related to the case, see Tarlock, Supplemental
Groundwater Irrigation Law: From Capture to Sharing, 73 Ky. L.J. 695 (1985).
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ing and/or deepening their wells. Therefore, if Indiana's common
law rule had been decisive in Prohosky, the net result would have
been non-optimal aquifer utilization.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts version of the reasonable use rule, the court would have embarked on a gestalt-seeking
voyage to an uncertain destination that would have had little, if
any, precedential value. 7 The evidentiary burdens of determining
whether an accommodation among competing users can be found
are substantial. In the end, it seems likely that, in accord with the
"justice" factor (coincidentally factor j in the list) and the protection of existing economies factor, 8 the low-volume users would
have prevailed and the cost of their well improvements would have
been cast onto the high-volume, junior-in-time users. The costs of
this loss-shifting would have been great; the parties would have
been required to retain experts and engage in litigation to obtain a
decision that, like decisions under the traditional common law,
would have been subject to revision if circumstances regarding additional uses of the aquifer were to change. Here aquifer utilization
will approximate that achieved by the regulatory approach, but the
cost of obtaining that result will be far higher.
In 1982, a commissioned study offered a well-conceived proposal
for a comprehensive permit scheme for Indiana. 9 The proposal
called for a universal permit requirement for all water uses in excess of 100,000 gallons per day. 0 If Prohosky had been decided
under this proposed comprehensive permit statute, the state permitting agency could have denied a permit to a high-volume irrigation pumper on the ground of "interference with any existing legal
use." 7 1 Alternatively, the agency could have granted a permit for
the high-volume use, requiring as a permit condition that the highvolume user provide replacement water in the short term and pay
for necessary pump improvements of shallow wells affected by the
72
high-volume pumping.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The list of factors appears in the text at supra note 6.
09 See Indiana Draft Statute, supra note 56.
70 Id. § 4(p). The call for a universal permit system sparked a political donnybrook. As a
result, the enacted version was stripped down and only provided authority for the state
administrative agency to set minimum streamflows, minimum water table heights and to
engage in data collection about the actual level of water use. The authority had not been
exercised in a way that would affect the Prohosky case.
" Id. § 18(a)(3).
72 Id. § 15(a). Section 15(b) limits the operation of subsection (a) by denying its benefits
to non-regulated wells dug after the effective date of the statute unless those wells are con07
"
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This result requires, in effect, that old shallow wells (like those
of the plaintiffs in Prohosky) be, improved at the expense of the
high-volume pumper. As a matter of equity and efficiency, the result is good73 but the dragnet of a universal permit system imposes
broad systemic costs for the regulation of users in regions where no
user conflicts are present. By regulating non-problem areas, comprehensive permit systems impose far larger direct costs for both
administrative and compliance efforts and thereby dilute available
administrative resources.
In contrast with the aforementioned choices, consider how Indiana's narrower "Emergency Regulation" statute, designed as it was
exclusively for well interference problems, provides certain results
at a lower total cost. If not grandfathered by the legislation, lowvolume pumpers have a choice to make: they can invest in legal
protection by meeting the state's well qualification standards or
they can take their chances that their water supply will not be impaired by the actions of significant withdrawal facilities.7 ' By requiring well contractors to provide their customers with an explanation of the regulatory protections for qualifying wells,75 the
statute also ensures that low-volume pumpers make informed investment decisions.
The administrative cost is not excessive since well standards are
set only once, via a typical administrative rulemaking, and regulatory intervention occurs only upon receipt of a complaint of well
interference.78 Upon receipt of a complaint, the agency needs only
to verify the interference and, thereafter, the outcomes are largely
foreordained. Regulatory energy is not spent in regions having no
live controversies and the regulatory responsibilities are not discretion-laden, resource-consuming adjudications. The scheme is a
blend of proactive (well standards for non-significant wells) and
targeted reactive (investigation of interference claims) regulatory
structed to function with reference to an administratively established "minimum groundwater level." The latter subsection has the effect of grandfathering old non-regulated wells,
but requiring all new non-regulated wells to be dug to an administratively determined reasonable depth in order to qualify for § 15(a) protection.
" See Tarlock, Supplemental Groundwater Irrigation Law, supra note 66, at 722:
A suit by a prior, small well owner against a subsequent large-scale pumper ought to
be treated differently from suits among high capacity pumpers. In the first case compensation (and, in appropriate cases, injunctive relief) ought to be the presumptive
rule where the plaintiff can prove physical interference among wells.
" Ind. Code Ann. § 13-2-2.5-10 (Burns Supp. 1989).
" Id. § 13-2-2.5-12.
76 Id. § 13-2-2.5-3.
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intervention.
The well interference-specific administrative system just described corresponds to the needs of Indiana and other states in
which well interference cases are not an exceedingly common phenomenon. Depending on local conditions, however, there are other
non-comprehensive regulatory strategies that could operate with
great efficacy. For example, Minnesota employs a permit system
premised on a presumption that the high-volume user must make
whole the small users. If well interference is probable, no permit
can issue until the applicant reaches a negotiated agreement with
the adversely affected parties concerning abatement and/or
compensation."
Likewise, the state agency plays the same role if unanticipated
well interference arises, restricting the operation of the high-volume user until a negotiated outcome is reached.78 Assuming the
agency is willing to superintend the holdout problem (an adversely
affected small user holding the high-volume use hostage by unreasonably refusing to agree) the system is one that appears to serve
both efficiency and equity without being unduly burdensome
administratively.
Selecting yet another limited approach, South Dakota also uses
permits in roughly the same way as Minnesota, but it also imposes
a well spacing requirement 9 that is roundly criticized by the economists as potentially inefficient.80 Without jumping too far into
that debate, it seems plausible that in specific cases where an aquifer of relatively uniform porosity and transmissivity is involved,
well spacing may be an elegant proactive avoidance of well interference problems.8"
The extended review of these different well interference approaches shows that there are a number of ingenious solutions to
the particular water allocation problem of well interference. One or
another of these problem-specific approaches might work better

"

Minn. R. 6115.0730 (1989).

78

Id.

79

S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 46-6-6.1 (1987).

8 Lotterman & Waelti, Efficiency and Equity Implications of Alternative Well Interfer-

ence Policies in Semi-Arid Regions, 23 Nat. Resources J. 323 (1983).
81 Interestingly, Iowa, which at the time had the prototypical vanilla permit system, was
criticized by those same economists as being inefficient. Economists argued that the lack of
negotiation prior to permitting and the great uncertainty of outcome in the event that well
interference occurs following issuance of a high-volume permit discourages efficient investment. Id. at 331-33.
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than a full-blown, standard-issue, comprehensive water use allocation permit system by avoiding the burden of regulating non-problem users in order to head off local conflicts that can be remedied
as they arise. That proposition is not a total condemnation of comprehensive systems, rather it is a caution that each state needs to
consider carefully the range of its own water allocation disputes
before deciding upon a regulatory regime.
2. Interbasin Diversion of Surface Water
In State of North Carolina v. Hudson,8 2 the City of Virginia
Beach, Virginia, proposed a water supply pipeline to import as
much as 60 million gallons per day (mgd) from Lake Gaston,
North Carolina, a part of the Roanoke River system. In seeking to
implement its plan to construct the withdrawal and pipeline facilities, Virginia Beach sought approvals from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) for permits under both the Rivers and
Harbors Act 83 and the Clean Water Act.8 4 Additionally, in regard
to water in the Kerr Reservoir of the Roanoke River system, the
city sought to enter into a water storage reallocation contract with
the Corps under the Water Supply Act of 1958.80
Once the favorable position of the Corps was announced, lawsuits erupted, brought by the State of North Carolina, conservation groups and others. To date, the litigation has focused largely
on the Corps' performance of its obligations under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)5 and only peripherally on any
law regarding water allocation. Nowhere is plain, ordinary state
water law in evidence; there are no state law riparian or state law
permit system claims.
The reason for these absent claims is twofold. To begin with,
although North Carolina has a permit system in place, 87 that system applies only to areas designated by the state agency as "Capacity Use Areas," and the Roanoke River system apparently has

82 665 F. Supp.

428 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (Lake Gaston, N. C. to Virginia Beach pipeline).

8' The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, §§ 9-10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
84 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8- 43 U.S.C. § 390b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of the interjurisdictional
water transfer problems at issue in Hudson, see Cox & Shabman, Virginia's Water Law:
Resolving the InterjurisdictionalTransfer Issue, 3 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 181 (1984).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
87 See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-215.11 to .22 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
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not been so-designated.8 8 Further, the permit system preserves the
law of riparianism,8 9 and under common law riparianism, there is
no valid basis for objection to an interbasin transfer of water if
there are no co-riparians in the basin of origin that will suffer actual harm.90
Analysis of the Hudson fact pattern under a typical comprehensive Eastern permit system begins by noting that the large withdrawal of water would have satisfied any jurisdictional requirement
thaf might be set. The permitting agency would then apply a substantive standard along the "reasonable beneficial use" lines in determining whether to permit the activity. It is difficult to imagine
that the purpose of the use, support of a growing city, would fail to
qualify, leaving the agency with no basis for permit denial on that
score.
Additionally, the permitting agency would consider the adverse
impacts on existing or future competing uses of the water, thereby
taking into account the "public interest" aspects of the transfer.
These might include the impacts of reduced streamflow and foregone water use opportunities in the area of origin. And the outcome? Just as the position of the trial judge on remand in Pyle v.
Gilbert is not enviable,91 neither is that of the administrative
agency in this setting. There is too little guidance to provide direction in the exercise of managerial discretion and the political
ramifications of a decision for or against transfer may be quite
substantial.
Municipal use, supported by the project, is patently a high-value
use. Still the agency might rightfully inquire about the accuracy of
the projected increase in demand, or the ability of Virginia Beach
and like communities to conserve existing supplies as an alternative to water importation. 2 The agency must also weigh adverse
impacts on the basin of origin. These will include harms to fishery
and potential losses to downstream economic interests in the basin
of origin. In this particular case, most of the benefits are to Virginia entities and most of the costs are borne by North Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.13 (1987).
Id. § 143-215.22.
90 See Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdiction,24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
591, 601-02 (1983).
9" See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
92 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 26 Cal.
3d 183, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 605 P.2d 1 (1980) (challenge to new appropriation by a California
municipality of water based on wasteful use of existing supply).
68
',
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entities which surely colors the agency's view of political aspects of
its decision. It seems probable that the agency could build a record
that would justify reaching a decision either permitting or refusing
the diversion application.
To critique the operation of the standard permit system without
regard to its outcome, consider the workings of the process from
the viewpoints of the affected entities. From the applicant's vantage, the possibility of permit denial as a result of a discretionladen administrative decision to protect the public interest puts at
risk the substantial investment that must precede a major interbasin transfer effort.9 3 Even if issued, the permit will be of short
duration in water project amortization terms-ten or twenty years
under most currently operating systems. Worse still, the possibility
that a permit could expire and renewal might be denied leaves the
importing region at risk of developing major installations in reliance on insecure water sources. In these ways, the typical permit
does not meet the needs of this type of applicant.
From the agency perspective, the process is, as already mentioned, too open-ended and too little driven by a coherent set of
policy guidelines. By considering each major permit in isolation,
the system muddles through, but in the end, the interest of the
public in foresighted, integrated water resource management is not
served. The ad hoc decisions are not predicated on a coherent, ascertainable vision of the public interest.
B.

Improving Regulatory Performance

To this point, this article has exposed some shortcomings of typical comprehensive permit systems in the well interference and interbasin transfer settings. That exercise identified, in the well interference context, alternatives to comprehensive permitting that
Eastern states might embrace to secure better management of the
scarce water resource. The remainder of this article will identify
some of the many potential means, other than the improvement of
the operation of those comprehensive permit systems themselves,
that appear to have promise as replacements or accompaniments
for riparianism in managing the waters of the East.

"3 Cf. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 321 (1984) (noting understandable reluctance of water project proponents to invest large sums in project planning absent reasonable
assurance that secure water rights can be obtained).
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1. Better Data Collection
Two centuries of reliance on the common law of riparianism
combined with the relative abundance of water in the Eastern
United States led to a situation in which most water use was unregulated and not under scrutiny by any governmental agency. One
direct consequence of that historic pattern is that, in many states,
compilations of water use data are very uneven in their accuracy.
There are some accurate existing sources of data. Data concerning
the quantity of water being used by water suppliers (public and
private) are generally good owing to the reporting requirements incident to being regulated utilities in most states."4 Likewise, with
the advent of the Clean Water Act and its active regulation of
many industrial water users, relatively accurate sets of data about
industrial water withdrawals are now available. In contrast to data
concerning water suppliers and manufacturers, however, the data
concerning other uses such as irrigation and stock watering use are
incomplete in most states.
Data about water use patterns, when lain alongside data about
streamflows and aquifer storage and recharge, allow foreknowledge
of what user conflicts are likely to become manifest. To act upon
that knowledge and minimize the potential adverse impacts is the
essence of water management. 5 For that reason alone, data collection must be improved.
Frequently, the application and exemption process of comprehensive permit systems has been the vehicle for data gathering,
but mere water use reporting laws collect the same data, 'arouse
less political opposition and require less administrative effort.
Moreover, the data gathering effort has an ancillary value beyond
the planning context; by collecting an "official" water use data set,
the transition from a common law system to a permit system,
which almost always entails a grant of permits to all pre-existing
water users, can be eased.
9' Also contributing to the accuracy of water supplier data is the American Water Works
Association, a trade organization of water suppliers which compiles extensive and accurate
reports of its members' activities.
11 In Indiana, the difficulty of obtaining reliable water use data initially hindered the
state Department of Natural Resources in utilizing the regulatory authority that was given
by the non-comprehensive 1983 Water Resource Management Act discussed above at supra
note 56 and accompanying text. Telephone conversation with Jim Hebenstreit of the Water
Division of the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (March 9, 1989).
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2. Rules of Inclusion and Exclusion
Most comprehensive permit systems have a volumetric cut-off as
their basic jurisdictional litmus, leaving small-volume users (usually intended to be domestic users) free of a permit requirement
and subjecting all other users to an undifferentiated permit requirement. Rules of inclusion and exclusion, as well as rules that
regulate waters differentially, can play a more vital role than
merely being the trigger for administrative jurisdiction.
Waters can be managed differentially, some more intensively,
others less so. This type of management already exists in some
states, such as North Carolina, where water is regulated only in
designated areas. 6 Likewise, many states have created what
amounts to differential management for subsets of the water supply by reserving minimum streamflows from competing use or limiting groundwater withdrawals to the safe annual yield.
Looking to the West for examples of still more varied rules of
inclusion and exclusion, the law of prior appropriation maintains a
dichotomy between natural waters and developed waters. Natural
waters are regulated and governed by rules designed to protect
multiple users of a single water source. In contrast, developed waters are, on a quasi labor-theory-of-property-basis, viewed as under
the dominion of the person through whose efforts the water was
developed.9 7 In the Eastern permit systems to date, the only hint
of this sort of reward for entrepreneurialism appears to be the special solicitude in the Iowa statute as to permit duration for stored
waters. 8 Why not reward utile investment in water management
facilities like the Western states reward water developers, or some
Western states reward their water salvagers?9 9 Why not grant to
water users who invest in increasing local water supply, water
rights that are free of the call of co-riparians and the inherent defeasibility of a durationally limited permit system?

See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
Developed water is water that would not otherwise be present in the basin and available for use, but for the efforts of the developer. This includes, most obviously, imported
water, although it may also include waters that would not otherwise reach a stream to be
available for appropriation. Importers of both surface water and groundwater are treated as
the owners of that water until it is abandoned. In this way, owners of developed water control its reuse as well as initial use. See, e.g., Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal. 2d 343, 90
P.2d 58 (1939)(surface water); Jensen v. Dep't. of Ecology, 102 Wash. 2d 109, 685 P.2d 1068
(1984)(groundwater).
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
" See Cal. Water Code §§ 1010(b), 1011(b) (West Supp. 1990).
"

17
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3. Transferrable Rights In Permitted Water Use
Riparianism on the one shore, and the typical comprehensive
permit system on the other, provide a Scylla of uncertainty and
Charibdis of over-particularization of water rights. Riparians never
know if their right is secure because its definition changes with the
activities of each new entrant into the water use equation; permits
are appurtenant, quantified, use-specific rights, not transferrable
apart from the land and are often not transferrable even to a new
use on the same land.
Transferrable permits offer one course through the shoals by
providing the right blend of flexibility of water use with certainty
of water right. Recalling the costs associated with managerial error,
if water rights could be moved privately from one use to another,
thereby adapting to changing conditions, the burden on the agency
to predict accurately the future would be reduced."' o Instead of a
permit system in which permits are wholly use-specific and appurtenant to the benefited land, truly transferrable permits would allow market mechanisms to play a significant role in insuring that
water is put to its most important uses.
The transferability of permits must be tempered in recognition
that the uses of a single water source are often interdependent.
Therefore, not all permits, nor even the full extent of the water
governed by any given permit, should be transferrable. For example, Arizona's Groundwater Management Act of 1980101 allows the
rights in irrigation water to be severed from the land, transferred,
and moved up the economic ladder. At the same time, the statute
also protects the interests of the other overlying owners in maintaining their relative security of right in the waters of the aquifer:
when water rights are transferred from appurtenant irrigation uses
to new, off-tract uses, the severed water rights undergo a standard
downward modification as to quantity. 102 By this device, Arizona
achieves a desirable balance of security and flexibility by providing
secure, transferrable water rights on which to predicate new investment without abandoning adequate protections for interdependent
100See, e.g., Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flexible
Market Prices, 57 Va. L. Rev. 345 (1971).
'0o Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-401 to -655 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
o Id. § 45-463 (1987). The limit accounts for return flow, and is calculated with reference
to irrigation utilizing reasonable conservation practices rather than to actual amounts withdrawn for irrigation in the past. This combines an elegance of regulation-not only does it
protect other overlying owners, it simultaneously limits administrative oversight to a minimum by disregarding actual practice in favor of a fixed standard for quantification.
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water users. The East should experiment with such devices.10 3
4.

Charging a Price for Water

Treating water as a free good before property rights in it are
recognized is the norm in both East and West. 10 4 Water users,
therefore, seldom view their water use as involving costs in excess
of the cost of capture and delivery. Occasionally states will charge
permit fees that attempt to defray the expense of operating their
administrative permit systems, but the water itself remains free for
the taking.
One exception to this pattern is Montana's relatively new
groundwater leasing program under which all large volume groundwater withdrawals must be leased from the state. 10 5 That program
has the potential to charge a price for the water above and beyond
the price of its production. Charging a price for water use is an
elegant (and potentially profitable for the state) regulatory methodology. If, for example, long-term water demand forecasts indicate that water demand will increase while supply will remain constant, overall water conservation is a plausible strategy that could
be achieved by charging a per unit price for the water. Charging a
price curtails demand and stimulates investment in water conservation. In contrast with the way a permit system would approach
the problem, through case-by-case determinations to deny or condition permits on the adoption of conservation measures, price incentives produce a similar result while preserving user flexibility to
decide on the appropriate level of conservation investment.
5. Better Policy Guidance
As the Virginia Beach interbasin transfer example makes clear,
when the standard permit systems fail to give explicit policy guidance, the administrative agency is apt to founder. The legislature
can cure this problem as is exemplified by the new Iowa allocation
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In Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 93

(1989), this author attempts a more detailed study of how permit-based water rights systems can achieve a degree of flexibility to permit transfers as a means of making those
systems more efficient and more responsive to the needs of water users.
04 Arguably the East does charge some price for water under riparianism because a part
of the value of riparian tracts is attributable to the water rights enjoyed by riparian proprietors. In the West, where the states hold the waters open for appropriation, no price whatsoever is attached to the water before rights are confirmed in an appropriator.
101 Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-301 (1989).
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policy directive. The legislature gave more power to the management agency and set priorities to determine which types of uses
would be curtailed in times of shortage.' °6 Although such guidance
is salutary, political realities have limited its appearance. On the
assumption that there will be no sudden surge in the level of political courage displayed in the water allocation policy arena, it is advantageous to seek less controversial regulatory thrusts to achieve
policy objectives related to water use or water allocation.
Take as an example the generic problem of the Hudson interbasin transfer case:' 0 7 the problem of predictable future water
shortages engendered by population growth in an area with an already stressed water supply. One obvious, wise policy choice for a
state is to encourage only that level of future water-dependent development that can be sustained by the region's water resources.
However, designing policy directives for the permitting agency that
would accomplish that end through a mix of permit grants, denials
and conditions seems a difficult thing to do directly.
Arizona has taken an indirect approach to limiting water-dependent development by a method only tangentially related to its
groundwater management permit system. That state requires all
land developers to demonstrate that they possess a 100-year assured supply of water sufficient to meet the needs of the proposed
development before the development can obtain the needed land
use permit. In the East, such a requirement would challenge the
private sector to develop water rights institutions that could carry
the burden of providing secure long-term water rights. Clearly, the
task is not an easy one in a region where water rights are neither
fully quantified nor transferable. Nevertheless, if some Eastern
permit system water rights were made transferrable, indirect methods, like an assured supply requirement as part of the land use
process, would spur the development of market institutions and remove the water agency from a part of the long-range planning process by substituting a private sector market mechanism.
CONCLUSION

This article began with the initial goal of describing the characteristics of comprehensive water allocation regimes that have been
advanced to replace the common law in the humid East and to
"o See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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survey the effectiveness of those systems in meeting Eastern water
allocation challenges. In probing the performance of comprehensive permit systems, the criticisms that emerged in this article are
not radically different from those proffered by earlier commentators. Where this article breaks with its orthodox forbearers is in
raising the proposition that rather than adjusting and improving
upon those comprehensive systems, the objects of water management in some Eastern states might be served better by the employment of a more varied system of regulatory initiatives.
In the last analysis, Eastern permit systems, whether comprehensive or not, must fulfill several conditions if they are to deliver
the promised improvements over reliance on the common law as
the means for making water allocation decisions. These conditions
correspond to the diverse needs of the classes of people affected by
the water allocation system:
(a) the system must add concreteness and predictability to the
rights of permit-holding water users without being overly confining and unnecessarily burdensome;
(b) the system must lend guidance to the administrative bodies
charged with permitting water uses and encourage them to go
forward and, where possible, incorporate allocational strategies
that reflect market values and thereby insure efficient resource
utilization;
(c) the system must achieve an overall coherence that fulfills the
public's expectations of rational, purposeful water allocation.
The standard comprehensive permit system fails these tests, although not always by a wide margin. Its dragnet often sweeps in
and burdens many users who pose little or no part of the allocational problem. Once permits are issued, they too severely restrict
the-uses that may be made of the allotted water, restricting the
flow of water to its highest and best use. 0 The standard system,
by relying on imported "reasonable use" concepts, offers little or
no real guidance to administrative officials save the hortatory command to achieve fair and efficient results-a goal that would be
their aim in any case. Lacking that guidance, the decisions of the
agency, taken as a whole, will always appear to be that which they
are, a series of loosely linked ad hoc decisions that bear no consistent relation to an articulated concept of the general welfare in reIO" The West has forged ahead in this area. In a presentation to the Annapolis conference,
Ken Burke quoted the Western water law proverb that applies, "[wiater runs uphill to
money."
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gard to water management.
To combat these and other shortcomings of orthodox permit systems, this article offered initial tentative examples of how more effective particularized regulatory schemes could be devised. These
suggestions included avenues for improving regulatory performance by resort to different and less cumbersome regulatory techniques, such as requiring reporting rather than permitting and
richer rules of inclusion and exclusion. The suggestions also exemplified methods that give the water users and market forces a
larger role in adjusting water allocation decisions. It is time to consider seriously these and other moves away from orthodoxy.

